"Intervention into Syria"

Issue : Intervention

 

This house believes that military intervention in Syria would do more harm than good.

 

Pin-Point SUMMARY

 

Prop.

 

**The immediate priority is to stop the loss of life on both sides in the conflict in Syria. The best guarantee of that is to allow Russian, French and British diplomats to work together to broker a ceasefire with immediate effect**

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1.    Military intervention in Syria is :

A.    ill-conceived

B.    short-sighted

C.    counter-productive

D.   generate more killings and massacres rather than stop them.

2.    Just as Mr Assad’s supporters use religion in Syria, so do his opponents. The footage coming out of Syria showing opposition forces killing soldiers and publicly torturing any who are accused of “spying” for the regime is deeply troubling; these are not the actions of democracy activists.

A.    In Tunisia and Egypt we heard cries for freedom, democracy and human rights.

B.    Sadly, in Syria, we are hearing shouts of “Allahu Akbar” and “jihad”. Al-Qaeda has now officially entered this conflict. Military intervention assumes that we will support one side.

C.    Granted, Mr Assad is an Iranian stooge. But at least we know the nature of that enemy. The debilitating differences among the opposition, the lack of leadership, the taking up of arms, the torture and killing of opponents, and the co-ordination with al-Qaeda and jihadists from Iraq and the Gulf should force us to stop and take stock. Who are we being asked to support, much less arm? And with what consequences?

3.    Moral impulse and outrage alone cannot shape foreign policy. Strategic calculations, national interests and geopolitical implications are paramount.

A.    In an attempt to stop the killing of thousands in Syria, military intervention and then toppling the regime risk unleashing forces that could kill millions.

B.    Mr Assad’s supporters are just as brutal and vicious as the opposition. With Christians and other minorities fleeing across the Middle East,

C.    how wise is it to put in power a dysfunctional Sunni opposition? The premature removal of the Assad regime by force would not only result in a sectarian bloodbath inside Syria, but also encourage Iraqi Sunnis to violently agitate against Shia rule in Iraq.

D.   The fragile political balance in Lebanon would be threatened by greater Sunni-Shia clashes, led by Hizbullah.

4.    The immediate priority is to stop the loss of life on both sides in the conflict in Syria.

A.    The best guarantee of that is to allow Russian, French and British diplomats to work together to broker a ceasefire with immediate effect.

B.    The British connection with Syria is unique: Mr Assad’s wife is British, and her father is Syria’s de facto ambassador-at-large in Europe.

C.    Without Russian involvement, the Syrian regime will not budge. A combined effort, with America at arm’s length, is still the best way forward.

D.   Agreement from the Syrian and Russian governments can pave the way for peace. Without this, even peacekeeping missions would be seen as a declaration of war by China, Russia, Iran and Syria

                        i.         Cooler heads must prevail in Western governments. Diplomatic options have not yet been fully exhausted.

                       ii.        

 

OPP.

 

Opponents of intervention need to explain how staying the current course—hoping that diplomacy might work when it has not for nearly a year—is likely to resolve an increasingly deadly civil war.

 

 

**Military action, in any context, should not be taken lightly. But neither should standing by and proposing measures that have, in Syria, so far failed to work.**

1.    The Syrian regime has made its intentions clear.

A.    In recent weeks, the killing and destruction has intensified. The city of Homs, to cite only one example, experienced ten days of unyielding assault by regime forces.

B.    The more, it seems, we try to find a last-ditch resolution through the United Nations, the Arab League or Russian mediation, the more Mr Assad wages war against his own people.

2.    The phrase “military intervention” understandably evokes weariness just by its very mention.

A.    No one, however, is arguing for an Iraq-style invasion with tens of thousands of boots on the ground.

                        i.         What is being suggested, including by both the French and Turkish foreign ministers, is the establishment of designated “buffer zones”, “safe zones” or “humanitarian corridors” that would serve the purpose of protecting civilian populations, ensure the flow of humanitarian assistance and—more controversially—help establish a beachhead for Syrian rebels from which to more effectively resist the Syrian regime.

B.    These options would probably necessitate taking out the Syrian military’s air defences.

3.    We might think that the Assad regime is about to fall, but clearly Mr Assad does not agree.

A.    The Syrian leadership still believes it can win. For Mr Assad, this is existential. If he “steps aside”, he (and his family) will live in constant in fear of imprisonment or assassination.

B.    In a new, democratic Syria, the Alawite community, a minority ruling over a majority, will—the thinking goes—be threatened with, at best, persecution and, at worst, bloody reprisals. Mr Assad may be rational, but his rationality may be leading him to conclude that his best chance for survival is to double down and fight to the bitter end.

C.    The international community’s failure to act has only reinforced such calculations. Mr Assad has concluded that he can get away with more repression and killing.

4.    One thing, however, that could alter Mr Assad’s calculations is the credible threat of military force.